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11 Introduction
Although it is difﬁcult to determine precisely how the costs of training workers are
shared between worker and ﬁrm, there are a number of prominent cases in which ﬁrms
appear to bear at least some of the costs of ‘general’ training.1 To take one celebrated
example, German apprentices receive two to three years worth of general skills training
withinaﬁrm, at substantialcosttotheﬁrms providingthetraining.2 Other examples in-
clude the provision of general skills training by temporary help supply ﬁrms described
by Autor (2001).
To economists brought up to believe that ﬁrms will not pay for general training of
this type, these investments represent something of a puzzle. As Becker (1962) ﬁrst
pointed out, in competitive labour markets, any attempt to recoup training costs by
paying trainees less than the value of their marginal product will result in them leaving
to earn their full value in another ﬁrm. The simple fact that ﬁrms do subsidise general
training is therefore of immediate theoretical interest: if the competitive paragidm is
an inadequate description of the labour market, then how does this market operate?
The motives behind ﬁrm investment in general skills may also have important pol-
icy implications. In the case of German Apprenticeship, whilst it is often argued that
other countries such as the US would beneﬁt from apprenticeship-type schemes (see
for example Baily, Burtless, and Litan (1992)), it is hard to make this case without
a more complete understanding of the reasons why German ﬁrms choose to pay for
these apprenticeships. As Harhoff and Kane (1997) point out “(T)he structure of in-
1See Bishop (1996) for an in-depth discussion of the evidence on this point.
2We will return to the issue of how general is GAT and look in more detail at the cost-sharing arrange-
ments in section 4.
2centives undergirding the German Apprenticeship System is not well understood - even
in Germany” (p.172).
The objective of this paper is to understand why ﬁrms make investments in general
training, andapplyourtheorytothecaseofGermanApprenticeship. In fact, signiﬁcant
strides have already made in this area. In particular, Acemoglu and Pischke (1999)
spell out the key condition under which ﬁrms pay for general training and describe a
number of mechanisms that satisfy it. Termed ‘wage compression’, the condition says
that for ﬁrms to invest in general training, the rents that ﬁrms earn on workers must be
an increasing function of training.
The model set out in this paper meets this condition and does, we believe, rely on
a much weaker set of assumptions than the other mechanisms so far proposed. The
basic ingredients of the model are ﬁrst, that workers are heterogenous with respect to
theirproductivityin different ﬁrms, and secondly, thatthis idiosyncratic match between
worker and ﬁrm is not immediately obvious to ﬁrms. Instead it must be inferred from
the worker’s CV, from interviews and so on. Since this ‘screening’ process is costly, in
equilibrium, a ﬁnite number of outside ﬁrms will post offers for workers. This result,
together with match heterogeneity, ensures that the worker’s match product is highest
in the ‘incumbent’ ﬁrm with strictly positive probability. In turn, this implies that the
incumbent ﬁrm can pay workers a wage less than their product and earn rents on these
workers. That these rents are increasing in the level of training is a byproduct of the
fact that training increases the costs of screening for other ﬁrms, thereby increasing the
incumbent ﬁrm’s monopsony power and their expected rents.
The importance of matching in the labour market is well known, and perhaps best
3illustrated by Topel and Ward (1992). They ﬁnd that 70% of the wage growth of young
workers between the ages of 18 and 30 is accounted for by job shopping. The impor-
tance of hiring costs, and the fact that they are increasing in the skill level of workers
is equally compelling. As noted in “expenses for recruiting, including agency fees or
advertising, and for screening, are higher for the skilled employee” (p.184). Indeed,
they report ﬁgures showing that the average hiring costs for professional, managerial
and technical workers are ﬁve times as great as those for skilled workers and twelve
times those for unskilled workers.
To illuminate the assumptions behind the mechanism that we suggest, we can nest
the various models of general training investment within the following equation de-
scribing the product of worker i in ﬁrm j:
vij = τjηj + ξij
Under this formulation, worker j’s expected product in ﬁrm i is a multiplicative func-
tion of his training τj and his ability ηj. His actual product is an additive function of
expected product and a random zero-mean worker-ﬁrm match term ξij.
Perhaps the most prominent model of ﬁrm investment in general training is Ace-
moglu and Pischke (1998). They assume that training τj is observed by all agents, but
that ability levels ηj are not. There are no matching considerations in the model. The
model’s key feature is that adverse selection on the outside labour market allows ﬁrms
to earn rents on workers. The multiplicative relationship between training levels and
ability then ensures that rents are increasing in training levels. A similar mechanism
4drives the model of Autor (2001), and allows temporary help supply ﬁrms to invest
in the general training of their workers. The third model in the asymmetric informa-
tion class is that of Chang and Wang (1996). Unlike Acemoglu and Pischke (1998)
and Autor (2001) however, they consider asymmetric information regarding the level
of training τj rather than ability ηj. In fact, Chang and Wang (1996) also give a role
to match productivity ξij, although it is not central to their results relating to general
training.
A related paper that deals with matching is Scoones (2000).3 Like Chang and
Wang (1996), the match product is an ‘experience good’ for the incumbent ﬁrm and
an ‘inspection good’ for other ﬁrms. That is, match product is initially unknown, is
revealed to the incumbent ﬁrm after the worker has spent some time in the labour
market and can then be inspected by all other ﬁrms. As regards training τj and ability
ηj, Scoones (2000) implicitly assumes that these are common knowledge.
The matching technology employed in our model is identical to that of Scoones
(2000) and we also assume that training levels τj and ability ηj are common knowl-
edge. The difference however is that we assume that the match product can only be
inferred by other ﬁrms at a cost k. This is the cost of screening workers. Since we
model the competition for workers as a ﬁrst-price auction, the screening cost acts as an
entry cost to the auction. As the entry cost tends to zero, the labour market becomes
competitive. The seller in the auction is the worker, but the reservation price is set
3The paper asks whether workers will invest the socially optimal levels of general and speciﬁc capital.
The answers are ‘yes’ and ‘no’. The intuition for the latter is that social welfare is maximised when workers
invest in speciﬁc training according to the probability of them remaining with the training ﬁrm (greater than
one-half). However, workers actually invest according to the probability of them leaving the training ﬁrm
(less than one-half), since workers only beneﬁt from speciﬁc training to the extent that it drives up their
outside option when they leave the incumbent ﬁrm.
5(strategically) by the incumbent ﬁrm. In this sense, the model is related to other auction
models with endogenous entry4 as well as the Milgrom and Weber (1982) limit-pricing
model.
Having set out the model in the ﬁrst part of the paper, the second part of the paper
is devoted to an empirical examination of one of its key implications. A unique fea-
ture of our model is that trained workers increase their wages upon leaving the ﬁrm.
This occurs because workers will always work for the winning bidder, whether this
be the incumbent (training) ﬁrm, or another ﬁrm on the outside labour market. This
implication is in stark contrast to that of the two most prominent explanations for ﬁrm
investment in German Apprenticeship Training (GAT) - the asymmetric information
model of Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) and models in which general and ﬁrm-speciﬁc
skills are complementary.5 In the Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) model, there is a
unique, competitive outside wage offer which the incumbent ﬁrm will always more
than match for those workers it chooses to keep. Hence movers are expected to earn
less than stayers. Similarly, in all models of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital, the rents generated
by the ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital are shared between the training ﬁrm and the trainee, and are
lost when workers leave the training ﬁrm.
To preview our results, we ﬁnd strong support in favour of our model and against
these other explanations. For a ﬂavour of our results, Figure 1 tracks the regression-
adjusted wages of ﬁve different groups of movers observed after the end of apprentice-
4Perhaps the most closely related is Fishman (1988) who considers the problem faced by the ﬁrst bidder
in a takeover bidding war. As in our model, the ﬁrst bidder makes a bid that will deter other ﬁrms from
entering the auction.
5The complementarity of general and ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills has been suggested as an explanation for ﬁrm
investment in German Apprenticeship Training by, inter alia, Soskice (1994). Since apprenticeship training
is observed by all parties in Germany, the model of Chang and Wang (1996) has never been considered in
this context. In any case, its implications are identical to those of Acemoglu and Pischke (1998).
6ship relative to the base group of stayers who remain with the training ﬁrm across all
ﬁve post-apprenticeship observations (and whose regression-adjusted wages are nor-
malised to zero). At the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship observation (roughly one year after
the end of apprenticeship), those workers that have already moved (MOVE01) earn
similar wages to the stayers. The group that move between the ﬁrst and second post-
apprenticeship observation (MOVE12) initially earn signiﬁcantly lower wages than
both groups, although by leaving the training ﬁrm, they dramatically increase their
relative wages. The same pattern is observed for other groups of movers.
We do not interpret our results as an outright rejection of all other models of ﬁrm
investment, since we believe for example, that certain segments of the labour mar-
ket (such as the market for low-skilled workers in which temporary help supply ﬁrms
typically operate) are likely to be characterised by a strong form of asymmetric infor-
mation. Instead, we argue that in more skilled labour markets such as the market for
German apprentices, where training is certiﬁcated and trainees are fairly well educated,
matching and screening may be a more plausible explanation for ﬁrm investment.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 sets out our model in more detail and
section 3 contrasts the empirical implications of this model with those derived from
the other models described above. Section 4 provides a brief overview of German
Apprenticeship Training (GAT) and section 5 describes the data used. The tests are
implemented in section 6, and our conclusions are presented in section 7.
72 A Model of Training
The purpose of the model is to explain why ﬁrms may invest in general training. The
essential ingredient that allows ﬁrms to invest in general training is ascreeningcost that
is increasing in the skill level of workers. Whilst we argued in the Introduction that this
is true in practise, it is not clear theoretically why the cost of screening a skilled worker
should exceed the cost of screening an unskilled worker. The point of the model is to
present a setting in which it arises naturally. In particular, in a world in which there is
match heterogeneity, the screening cost is viewed as the cost of inspecting the match
product that must be incurred by ﬁrms on the outside labour market. In equilibrium,
this ‘softens’ the competition for skilled workers faced by the incumbent ﬁrm, allowing
the incumbent ﬁrm to earn rents on skilled workers and thereby pay for training.
2.1 Basic Set-Up
We begin by laying out the assumptions of the model:
A1 The economy consists of a large number of inﬁnitely-lived ﬁrms. These ﬁrms
produce homogenous output taking the price as given (normalised to unity) and
produce according to a linear production technology.
A2 Workers are assumed to live for two periods and are characterised by ability
level ￿j and training level τj. Ability is ﬁxed across periods and workers are
born untrained (τj =0 ,∀j).
8A3 The productivity of worker j in ﬁrm i, vij, can be described as follows:
vij = αj + ζij
where αj = α(￿j,τj) is the general skill level of worker j and ξij is the quality
of match between ﬁrm i and worker j. W ea s s u m et h a tζij is a random draw
from a uniform distribution with mean zero and support (ξ,ξ), and we assume
that for worker j, these draws are independent across ﬁrms. The uniform as-
sumption is not essential, but will simplify some of the analysis. Notice that
training is ‘general’ in the sense that it increases the worker’s general skill level
αj independently of the ﬁrm that the worker is matched to.
2.2 Timing
The model proceeds in two periods (with no discounting between periods):
1. Period 1
i Firms have no information about school-leavers other than their expected
productivity level αj. Hence ﬁrms attract workers by posting entry wages
indexed by αj. By symmetry, the equilibrium entry wage will be identical
across ﬁrms, and since workers are assumed to care only about wages, they
choose the initial ﬁrm (which we will call the incumbent ﬁrm) at random.
ii Training takes place.
iii The incumbent ﬁrm (but no other agents) observe the quality of their match
9to worker j. They do not however observe worker j’s potential match qual-
ity in other ﬁrms.
2P e r i o d 2
i The incumbent ﬁrm makes a wage offer (w0) to the worker
ii Before accepting the offer, the worker attempts to obtain a better offer from
other ﬁrms. To do this, she sends a CV to every ﬁrm describing αj,a n dt h e
minimum wage offer that she prepared to accept, wMIN.
iii Upon receiving the worker’s CV, other ﬁrms have to decide whether or not
to inspect it. The cost of doing so is k. Once inspected, they can decide
whether to make an offer to the worker, and if so, what the offer should be.
iv After receiving offers from all ﬁrms, the worker moves to the ﬁrm offering
the highest wage provided this wage exceeds w0. Otherwise, she stays with
the incumbent ﬁrm and earns w0.
2.3 Computing Equilibria
Our strategy for computing the equilibria of the model is as follows. First, we show
that the minimum acceptable wage demanded by the worker will be exactly the initial
wage offer made by the incumbent ﬁrm. This simpliﬁes the second period of the model
so that there are now only three subperiods - the incumbent ﬁrm makes a wage offer,
other ﬁrms make offers and the worker accepts the highest offer received.
We analyse the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game. Hence we begin by
analysing the entry process conditional on the incumbent’s wage offer w0 and the entry
10cost k. A zero proﬁt condition gives the number of ﬁrms inspecting the match, n,
as a decreasing function of both the incumbent’s initial wage offer and the inspection
cost, n(w0,k). We then compute the intial wage offer that maximises the proﬁt of the
incumbent. This will take account of n(w0,k), and hence will be a function of match
productivity and the inspection cost, w∗
0(v0,k). Given this function describing the
optimal wage offer, we then analyse the ﬁrm’s incentives to train in terms of the impact
of training on (equilibrium) expected proﬁts Π∗(v0,k).
2.4 Worker’s Minimum Acceptable Wage Offer
The worker is acting as a seller in an auction with entry, where her own value of the
itemis w0 - her utility if there is no sale. Hence we can use the following result, derived
in Mcafee and Mcmillan (1987):
Proposition 1 (McafeeandMcmillan(1987)):Theminimumacceptablewagereported
by the worker will be the initial wage offer of the incumbent ﬁrm.
Proof. The seller’s (worker’s) expected revenue is the winning bidder’s valuation
minus the expected proﬁt of the n bidders that enter E(v) − nk. Hence for a given
number of bidders, n, and an inspection cost k, the seller (worker) maximises revenue
by setting a reserve price equal to his own valuation. See Mcafee and Mcmillan (1987),
p.344.
Hence with free entry, and in contrast to the ﬁxed-n case, the seller will not distort
the reservation price. Or in this context, the minimum acceptable offer demanded by
the worker will simply be the offer made by the incumbent ﬁrm. Since the incum-
11bent ﬁrm is aware of this fact, they know that their initial wage offer will be perfectly
transmitted to their potential rivals and so they will set this wage strategically.
2.5 Entry
From equation (A3) of Appendix A, the expected proﬁt of an entrant after it has drawn





where f w0 =( w0 − αj) and G(x) is the probability that the ﬁrm’s match (x)i st h e
highest of all the n potential bidder’s matches. Hence G(x)=F(x)n−1.B e f o r e i t
draws its valuation (and therefore, before it pays the cost of inspecting the match), the
















[F(ξ)n−1(1 − F(ξ))]dξ − k
12Hence the free entry (pure strategy) equilibrium number of entrants (n) is determined




[F(ξ)n−1(1 − F(ξ))]dξ (1)
Equation (1) deﬁnes thenumber of entrants nas an implicit functionof theincumbent’s
wage offer f w0 and the cost of inspecting the match, k.W ea s s u m et h a tk is sufﬁciently
s m a l lt h a tf o rf w0 =ξ,n≥ 1. In other words, the incumbent ﬁrm will always face at
least one competititor when its wage offer net of general skills is equal to the support
of the match distribution.7
2.5.1 Comparative Statics
We want to describe how n varies with the reservation price f w0 and the entry cost k.






f w0[1 − F(ξ)]logF(ξ)[F(ξ)]n−1dξ
< 0 (2)
6In fact we treat n as a continuous variable rather than an integer.
7We are assuming throughout that the outside ﬁrms must pay the cost k in order to inspect the match.
Were these ﬁrms able to make ‘blind’ offers without having to inspect the match, competition amongst
outside ﬁrms would ensure that these ‘blind’ offers were equal to the expected value of the match. Hence
the equilibrium that we describe would refer only to the one-half of trained workers with matches better than
expected match quality. Otherwise, the results are unchanged.
13since F(ξ) ≤ 1 hence lnF(ξ) ≤ 0. In other words, as we would expect, a higher entry




F(f w0)n−1(1 − F(f w0))
R ξ
f w0[1 − F(ξ)]logF(ξ)[F(ξ)]n−1dξ
< 0 (3)
Intuitively, a higher wage offer by the incumbent ﬁrm reduces the number of ﬁrms
willing to pay the inspection cost. This occurs ﬁrst, because these ﬁrms realise that
they are unlikely to be able tomake an offer above this ‘reservationprice’ and secondly,
because even if they are, their expected proﬁts from doing so are reduced.
2.6 Retention
W h e nt h eﬁ r ms e t st h ei n i t i a lw a g ew0 it trades off two forces: ﬁrst, a higher wage
reduces proﬁts. Secondly, a higher wage reduces the probability of the worker leaving
the ﬁrm. To understand the second effect, note that:











Equation (4) illustrates the two effects of an increase on f w0 on the probability of re-
taining workers: ﬁrst, there is a direct effect which holds for ﬁxed n (the second term
14inside the square brackets). Secondly, there is an indirect effect, in that a higher wage












for f w0 > ξ, since dn
df w0 < 0 and lnF(f w0) ≤ 0 and
F0(f w0)
F(f w0) > 0.
2.7 Optimal Wage Offer
The proﬁt of the incumbent ﬁrm can be written:
Π =( v0 − w0)P(stay)
=[ ( αj + ξ0) − w0]P(stay)
=[ ξ0 − f w0]P(stay)
The ﬁrst-order condition for the maximisation of this function is:
f w0
∗ = ξ0 − H(f w0
∗) (5)
where H(f w∗
0) is deﬁned as above.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique optimal wage offer for the incumbent ﬁrm w∗
0,
where αj + ξ <w ∗
0 ≤ v0 ≤ αj + ξ
15Proof. We know that H(f w0) is positive, and since all of the terms in H(f w0) are
continuous on the open interval (ξ,ξ),H (f w0) is also continuous on the open interval
(ξ,ξ). It can also be shown that as f w0 −→ξ from above, H(f w0) → 0. To prove this,
note that H(f w0)= 1
1
F(g w0)[( dn
dg w0 )l nF(f w0)F(f w0)+nF 0(f w0)] and note that as f w0 −→ξ from
above, F(f w0) → 0. From (3) the numerator of ( dn
df w0) tends to zero as F(f w0) → 0,
hence ( dn
df w0) → 0 as f w0 −→ξ.A l s o , lnF(f w0)F(f w0) → 0 as F(f w0) → 0, hence
the term in square brackets tends to nF0(f w0) as f w0 −→ξ. Since this is constant in
the uniform case, and since 1
F(f w0) →∞as F(f w0) → 0, we have that H(f w0) → 0
as f w0 −→ξ. Hence the function deﬁned by the right-hand side of the equation must
intersect the function deﬁned by the left-hand side of the equation at least once over
this interval. To demonstrate that the functions intersect only once, it is sufﬁcient to
show that H’(f w0) > −1. We show this in Appendix A. Since H(f w0)≥ 0, f w0
∗ ≤ ξ0 so
w∗
0 ≤ αj + ξ0.S i n c eξ0 ≤ ξ, the ﬁrm will never make in offer in excess of αj + ξ.
S i n c ew eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tn ≥ 1 when w0 =ξ, the ﬁrm will never make an offer less
than αj + ξ, since it is sure to lose all of its workers in that case.
2.7.1 Comparative Statics
Thetwoexogenousvariablesinthisset-up(givenαj)aretheentrycostk, andtheinitial
matchξ0. Concentrating ﬁrst on the entry cost k, we show that increases in k reduce the
equilibrium wage offer of the incumbent ﬁrm. This result is entirely intuitive: increased
inspection costs deter potential bidders, giving the incumbent ﬁrm more market power.




dk < 0.A sk −→ 0,w 0 −→ v0
16Proof. The ﬁrst part of this proposition is proved by taking differentials with re-
spect to k and f w0. Rewriting equation (5) as:









1 + Hw0(f w0)







df w0 lnF(f w0)+
nf(f w0)
F(f w0) ]2
since it is obvious from equation (1) that d
dk( dn
df w0)=0 .H k(f w0) is now positive by
virtue of the fact that the dn
dk < 0 (equation (2)). The second part of the proposition
comes from the fact that from equation (1), as k −→ 0, n −→ ∞.A s n →∞ ,
the denominator of H(w0) →∞since
nF 0(f w0)
F(f w0) →∞ , hence H(f w0) −→ 0 and so
w0 −→ v0.
Turning next to the worker-ﬁrm match, we show that increased levels of match
productivity in the training ﬁrm correspond to higher initial wage offers. Again this





Proof. This comes from taking differentials of equation (1) with respect to ξ0 and
f w0 and noting that 1 + Hw0(f w0) > 0.
17Finally, we examine the effects of a change in the ‘general skills’ of worker j.W e
show that an increase in general skills induces a one-for-one shift in the equilibrium
initial wage offer. The intuition for this result is that since this aspect of a worker’s
productivity is common to all ﬁrms, changes are perfectly reﬂected in the wage offers





Proof. Since the expression for proﬁts includes only the term f w0,w h e r ef w0 =
w0 − αj, any change in αj must produce compensating changes in w0.
2.8 Training
We now wish to examine whether the incumbent ﬁrm will subsidise the cost of general
training. Ultimately, this will depend on whether training increases the equilibrium
proﬁts of the incumbent ﬁrm. Hence we derive the necessary and sufﬁcient condition
for ﬁrms to subsidise the cost of general training as the third in a set of three results:
Proposition 6 (i) A change in αj has no effect on proﬁt. .
(ii) An increase in the costs of inspecting matches increases the equilibrium proﬁts
made by the incumbent ﬁrm.
(iii) If dk
dτ=0, ﬁrms will not subsidise training. If dk
dτ > 0, ﬁrms will subsidise
training.
Proof. (i) We have shown that a change in αj produces an exactly compensating
change in w∗
0. Since the equilibrium probability of staying depends only on f w0,w e
therefore have that proﬁts depend only on f w0 hence proﬁts are not a function of αj.
18(ii) The second result follows from differentiating the proﬁt function with respect to k,










S i n c ew eh a v es h o w nt h a tdn
dk < 0 and since
dP[stay(f w∗
0)]




0. (iii) To prove the third result, consider the entry wage/training combination offered
by ﬁrms. Competition among ﬁrms for new workers (school-leavers) ensures that the
entry wage/training combination maximises the worker’s utility subject to a break-even
constraint. Normalising the value of the worker’s output in the ﬁrst period to zero, the
break-even constraint can be written as:
we = Π(w∗
0) − C(τ) (6)
In other words, any proﬁts/losses made by ﬁrms after the training period are passed
back to the workers in the form of higher wages. Hence the issue of whether training is
subsidised is one of whether ﬁrms increase proﬁts by providing training. From results
(i) and (ii), this only occurs when dk
dτ > 0.
2.9 A Screening Technology Example
Since the question of whether ﬁrms pay for general training hinges on whether or not
screening costs are increasing in the general skill level of workers, we propose two
simple conditions under which this will hold. Suppose that a ﬁrm wishes to inspect
the match between itself and a given applicant j, with general skill level αj. To do this,
19we assume that it needs only to read the worker’s CV. We assume that reading the CV
takes time t,w h e r et depends on both the skill level of the applicant j (αj) and the skill
level of reader k (αk). Assuming constant returns to reading CVs, the cost of hiring a
worker is then:
h(αj,αk)=αkt(αj,αk)
where αk is the opportunity cost of reader k’s time, and t(.) is the length of time taken
to read the CV. For a given general skill level of applicant, the ﬁrm chooses the skill
level of the reader that will minimise this cost, α∗





Then there are two simple cases in which hiring costs can be increasing in αj :
1. ItmaybethatthetimetakentoreadaCV,conditionalonthereader’sgeneralskill
level, is increasing in the general skill level of the applicant. This would occur if
the CVs of skilled applicants took longer to read (because they contained more
information).
2. Suppose instead that the time taken to read a CV, conditional on the general skill
level of the reader, is not a function of the general skill level of the applicant,
but that only workers with skill levels higher than those of the applicant can read
the CV (αk ≥ αj). Then, since more highly skilled workers are required to read
the CVs of more highly skilled applicants, opportunity costs and therefore hiring
20costs are greater.
Eitherofthesemechanismswouldprovidearationaleforscreeningcostsincreasing
in the general skill level of workers, and we have already shown in our Introduction that
the empirical evidence is strongly supportive of this assumption. Having shown how
this assumption can account for the fact that ﬁrms invest in general training, the rest of
the paper is devoted to an assessment of the empirical implications of this model.
3 Testable Implications and Empirical Strategy
In this section, we derive the testable implications of the model, and compare them
with those derived from the model of asymmetric information proposed by Acemoglu
and Pischke (1998) and the generic ﬁrm-speciﬁc training model. The principal impli-
cation will involve a comparison of the wage changes of those leaving the training ﬁrm
(‘movers’) with the wage changes of those staying with the training ﬁrm (‘stayers’).
3.1 Wages
F o c u s s i n gﬁ r s to nt h ewage levels of trained workers, it is obvious that the expected
wage levels of stayers are lower than the expected wage levels of movers conditional on
the match to the incumbent ﬁrm. To see this, consider two workers with match product
v
+
0 within the incumbent ﬁrm. Both workers will receive wage offer w∗
0(v
+
0 ) from the
incumbent ﬁrm. Hence if one worker leaves the incumbent ﬁrm, it must be because she
has received a wage offer in excess of w∗
0(v
+
0 ). Hence conditional on v0, the wages of
‘movers’ exceed those of ‘stayers’. However, it can be shown that the probability of
21staying with the incumbent ﬁrm is an increasing function of match quality. This comes
from the fact that the probability of staying with the the training ﬁrm is increasing
in w∗
0 (equation (4)) and the fact that the equilibrium wage is increasing in match ξ0
(Proposition 4). Hence in general, we can not determine whether or not the expected
wage levels of stayers will exceed the expected wage levels of movers.
We can however make predictions about the wage changesexperienced by a worker
leaving the incumbent ﬁrm. Supposing that we allow for some time to elapse between
the worker receiving the wage offer from the incumbent ﬁrm and all of the wage offers
from the outside labour market, then our model predicts that the wages of movers will
exceed those of stayers, since workers will only ever leave the incumbent ﬁrm to earn
higher wages. Wesummarisebothofour results regardingthewagesoftrainedworkers
as follows:
WMOVE ≶ WSTAY (MS-L1)
∆WMOVE > ∆WSTAY (MS-C1)
We now compare these predictions with those derived from the other models.
3.2 Alternative: Asymmetric Information
Thecrucial assumption in the asymmetricinformation model of Acemoglu and Pischke
(1998) is that workers’ ability is revealed only to the incumbent ﬁrm. To keep things
simple, suppose that there are only two types of ability - good workers and ‘lemons’.
Suppose also that a fraction of both types of worker leaves the ﬁrm at the end of the
22ﬁrst period for exogenous reasons. Then the ﬁrm lays off the lemons and makes a
wage offer to the good workers. This wage offer is determined by the outside wage
offer, which in turn depends on the expected proportion of good and bad workers on
the outside labour market. The ﬁrm’s optimal wage offer is then slightly above this
outside wage, ensuring that the ﬁrm keeps all of the remaining good workers. Since
this wage will be below the productivity of good workers, the ﬁrm can earn rents on
trained workers. That these rents are increasing in the level of training occurs because
the productivity of workers is assumed to be a multiplicative function of ability and
training.
In principle, there are at least three testable implications of the asymmetric infor-
mation hypothesis. First, the model implies that in their ﬁrst post-training job, the wage
levels of the trainees that stay with the training ﬁrm should exceed the wage levels of
those that move ﬁrms:
WMOVE <WSTAY (AP-L1)
Secondly, since workers that leave the ﬁrm for observable exogenous reasons (such
as military service) should be paid the expected product of the entire population of
trainees, the wages of these workers should exceed those of other movers:
WMOVE(EXOG) >WMOVE(OTHER) (AP-L2)
23Finally, the asymmetric information assumption implies that:
WMOVE(QUIT) = WMOVE(LAY OFF) (AP-L3)
One problem with the asymmetric information story concerns its extension from
two to multiple periods. In that case, workers can signal their ability by accepting an
offer from the incumbent ﬁrm. Hence to extend the asymmetric information argument
to multiple periods, it must be the case that ability is not perfectly observed by the
incumbent ﬁrm at the end of the training period. Hence a stronger test of the asymmet-
ric information hypothesis would involve a comparison of the wage changes of those
trainees that stay with the training ﬁrm for a short time after training and then move,
with the wage changes of those that remain with the training ﬁrm:
∆WMOVE < ∆WSTAY (AP-C1)
∆WMOVE(EXOG) > ∆WMOVE (AP-C2)
∆WMOVE(QUIT) = ∆WMOVE(LAY OFF) (AP-C3)
3.3 Alternative: Firm-Speciﬁc Training
In the standard model of ﬁrm-speciﬁc training, ﬁrms and workers share the rents asso-
ciated with the speciﬁc component of the training8. Hence we would expect the wage
levels of stayers to exceed the wage levels of movers. Similarly, when workers leave
the training ﬁrm, they lose their share of the speciﬁc human capital rents. Hence we
8See Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) for a model in which general and speciﬁc skills are complementary.
24would also expect the wage changes of stayers to exceed the wage changes of movers:
WMOVE <W STAY (FS-L1)
∆WMOVE < ∆WSTAY (FS-C1)
3.4 Empirical Strategy
We test between our model and these two alternatives by comparing both the wage
levels and wage changes of ‘stayers’ and ‘movers’. However, we place more emphasis
on the wage change results for three reasons. First, because our model is ambiguous as
regards the expected wage levels of movers versus stayers. For a given level of match
quality, movers earn higher wages, but the ‘stayers’ tend to be the workers with the best
matches. The second problem with comparing the wage levels of movers and stayers is
that we have argued that only a comparison of wage changes can serve as a test of the
asymmetric information explanation once it has been extended from two to multiple
periods.
Most importantly however, the third reason for focusing on wage changes is be-
cause we believe that tests based on wage levels will be biased because of unobserved
heterogeneity. Implicitly, all of the empirical implications that we have so far derived
refer to wages conditional on all those characteristics observed by the training ﬁrm and
the outside labour market (in our model, αj). Yet it is clear that the econometrician
does not observe all these characteristics (in the German case, the obvious example is
the test scores reported on the apprenticeship certiﬁcate). If these unobserved ability
25components are correlated with the decision to stay or leave the training ﬁrm (for ex-
ample, if better workers are more likely to stay), then these tests may falsely accept
the asymmetric information and/or the ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital hypotheses. Since ﬁrst dif-
ferencing wages will eliminate any permanent component of earnings correlated with
the decision to leave the training ﬁrm, estimates based on ﬁrst-differenced wages are
robust to this problem.
In fact, rather than directly estimate the wage changes of movers and stayers, we
estimate the wage differential between movers and stayers in two levels equations cor-
responding to observations before and after the group of movers leave the training ﬁrm.
Then, comparing the estimated move-stay differentials in both periods (a regression-
adjusted difference-in-difference procedure) is akin to estimating a model in ﬁrst dif-
ferences. The advantage of this approach is that it provides us with a neat way of
comparing the wages of different groups of movers and stayers over a longer period -
in our case, across ﬁve post-apprenticeship periods. Before turning to our data and em-
pirical results however, we provide some contextual detail regarding the GAT system.
4 German Apprenticeship Training
In this section, we summarise the GAT system by way of seven stylised facts. Since the
generality of apprenticeship skills and the fact that ﬁrms actually pay for this training
are central to our story, we begin with a discussion of the evidence on these points. We
then consider the recruitment and retention of trainees before discussing the evidence
regarding screening costs.
264.1 The Nature of Apprenticeship Skills
The foundation of GAT remains the 1969 Vocational Training Act. This Act deﬁned a
number of occupations in which apprentices could be trained. These currently number
some 375, with GAT lasting between two and three years, depending on the occupa-
tiontrained in. Importantly, it alsospeciﬁedthecurriculathatwouldbefollowed within
each of these apprenticeship occupations. The Act also required that training ﬁrms re-
lease their apprentices for one day a week to attend a local vocational college organised
around one of ﬁve vocational ﬁelds (industry, commerce, home management, agricul-
ture and other occupations). These colleges were designed to ﬁll any gaps in general
education and to prepare apprentices for the ﬁnal examination. These examinations are
heavily regulated, and typically consist of several written examinations in the subjects
laid down by the training regulations, with many including an oral or practical compo-
nent. Together, these regulations ensure that training is in principle ‘general’, at least
within an occupation. Against this, it could be argued that these correspond only to
minimum requirements, although as Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) report, ﬁrms typi-
cally do not have the time to train beyond these minimum requirements.
SF1 Although a worker apprenticed in a given occupation will not be able to transfer
all of her training to every ﬁrm in the economy, she will be able to transfer all of
her training to every ﬁrm operating jobs in the same occupation. In this sense,
the training is ‘general’
274.2 Estimates of Net Cost
Since the 1969 Vocational Training Act came into force, there have been three at-
tempts to assess the extent to which German ﬁrms pay for apprenticeship training9.
Each subtracts the production value of apprentices (P) from total training costs, where
costs comprise direct training costs (apprenticeship wages (WAPP) plus materials cost
(CM)) and the wage costs of training personnel (CTRAINER):
NetCost=( WAPP + M)+CTRAINER− P
The value of an apprentice’s production (P) is calculated as the product of three fac-
tors: the time spent by apprentices in production as reported by supervisors (s), their
estimated productivity relative to skilled workers (γ) and the productivity of skilled
workers (as measured by their wages, WSKILLED). The costs of training person-
nel are the time spent with apprentices (t) multiplied by the wage costs of trainers
(WTRAIN)10. Hence:
NetCost=( WAPP + CM)+tWTRAIN − sγWSKILLED
Themostcontentious elementofthis calculationis thewagecostoftrainers, WTRAIN.
In large ﬁrms, where full-time training personnel are employed, these costs are easily
accounted for. In small ﬁrms by contrast, apprentices may simply watch the supervisor
at work, or train at times when work is slack. In that case, it is not clear how large are
9These are described in more detail by Harhoff and Kane (1997).
10Since apprentices spend some of their time in the local vocational school, s + t<1
28training personnel costs.
The ﬁrst two studies - undertaken for 1971/72 and 1980 - estimated training per-
sonnel costs in small craft ﬁrms by asking supervisors how much time they spent with
trainees (t) and then multiply the supervisor’s wage by this fraction. In the case of the
second study, this produced a ﬁgure for net costs per apprentice per year of $9381 in
the large ﬁrm (industry) sector and $5991 in the smaller ﬁrm (craft) sector (in 1990$)11.
The third study - undertaken for 1991 - attempted to shed some light on the possible
over-estimation of training ﬁrm costs in small ﬁrms, by excluding the wage costs of
any trainers not engaged in training on a full-time basis. Using this method, estimated
costs are $5485 for large industrial ﬁrms and $240 for smaller craft ﬁrms.
SF2 The net costs of training apprentices for large industrial ﬁrms are substantial. For
smaller craft ﬁrms, they are much smaller, and perhaps zero.
4.3 Recruitment and Retention
We turn next to the provision of training places and the retention of new trainees. The
ﬁrst point to note is that whilst the majority of ﬁrms in Germany train apprentices, not
all do so. Using data from an establishment panel of more than 4000 ﬁrms, Bender
and Schwerdt (2000) ﬁnd that in 1993, whilst over 85% of ﬁrms with more than 500
employees trained apprentices, the ﬁgure among ﬁrms with less than 50 employees was
less than 30%.
SF3 The vast majority of large industrial ﬁrms train apprentices. Less than one-third
11Reported by Harhoff and Kane (1997) and converted at a rate of 1.62DM.
29of small craft ﬁrms train apprentices.
In terms of the quality of apprentices recruited, there seems to be a clear correlation
between school-leaving ability and ﬁrm size. Using self-reported Maths and German
test score data, Harhoff and Kane (1993) show that those taking apprenticeships in the
largest ﬁrms scored higher than those taking apprenticeships in the smallest ﬁrms.
SF4 The most able school-leavers apprentice in large industrial ﬁrms. The least able
apprentice in small craft ﬁrms.
Finally, Harhoff and Kane (1997) provide evidence on the propensity of ﬁrms to
train according to local labour market conditions. In probit and tobit estimates of the
incidence and extent of training, they ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative impact of the number
of other ﬁrms operating in the same industry in the local county.
SF5 Firms are more likely to train when there are fewer local competitors operating
in the same industry.
Turning to the retention of apprentices, another important fact concerns the high
degree of post-apprenticeship mobility. Whilst Harhoff and Kane (1997) ﬁnd that
amongstasampleofapprenticesgraduatingin1980, theaverageretentionrateofnewly
completed apprentices was 75%, this falls to 60% for those within one year of com-
pletion and 40% for those within ﬁve years of completion. Among smaller craft ﬁrms,
retention rates are lower. Only 65% remain with the training ﬁrm upon completing
apprenticeship, and this falls to 50% for those within one year of apprenticeship and
30% for those within ﬁve years of apprenticeship. Amongst larger industry ﬁrms, the
30ﬁgures are 80%, 70% and 50%. We provide our own evidence on this point in section
7.
SF6 Retention rates of new apprentices are higher in larger industrial ﬁrms than
smaller craft ﬁrms.
4.4 Screening Costs
Wagner (1998) discusses the evidence relating to the costs of screening newly appren-
ticed workers in Germany. She argues that the costs of screening workers may be up to
$1,200-$1,800 per hire12:
“Companiesthathireskilledworkersfromthemarkethavetopaycosts
for advertisements, screening applicants, doing interviews at different lev-
els and hiring costs. These have been estimated by a large German com-
pany to reach 2000DM-3000DM per hire” (p.6).
Moreover, she argues indirectly that these costs are likely to be far lower for un-
skilled workers. Referring to the costs of screening untrained school-leavers she claims
that it is less costly to test their skills, since “(T)hey will learn these on the job, and one
person is sufﬁcient to conduct the interviews” (p.6). Since the same argument would
presumably apply to older unskilled workers, we draw the following conclusion, in line
with the evidence summarised in the Introduction:
SF7 Screening costs are higher for skilled workers (apprentices) than unskilled work-
ers (non-apprentices).
12In $1990 and converted at a rate of 1.62DM.
315 Data Issues
The paper uses two sets of data to implement the tests discussed in section 3: the IAB
data, a 1% sample of German social security records, and the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSOEP), a much smaller survey of German households13. These data are com-
plementaryinthesensethattheformercontainsdetailedwagehistoriesforahugenum-
ber of individuals, but very little other information. Whilst the latter is much smaller
in size, there are some interesting questions in the survey that we will exploit in our
analysis.
5.1 IAB Data
The IAB data are available for the years 1975-1995, and are supplemented by data on
the ﬁrms to which workers are attached. Importantly, this allows us to infer the ﬁrm
trained in, and we have some limited information on this ﬁrm (including its size and
the industry in which it operates). The data do not cover the entire German labour
force. Civil servants and the self-employed do not make social security contributions
in Germany, and so they are not present in the data. The data are top coded, although
the top coding affects only a tiny proportion of the young apprentices in our sample.
5.1.1 The Basic Sample
Only German male apprentices are retained for analysis. In order to exclude those
engaged in short training spells, internships and the like, apprentices are deﬁned as
those having been observed training for greater than 450 days. We further restrict the
13See the Data Appendix for a more detailed discussion of the two data sets.
32sample of apprentices to those without the Abitur (usually completed by those that
will eventually attend University) and those starting their apprenticeship aged 19 or
under. The age restriction is designed to include those that take their military service
after leaving school, but exclude those training after a spell in the labour market. We
exclude those with an Abitur as the labour market for apprentices with this qualiﬁcation
will be signiﬁcantly different to that for those without an Abitur. In any case, this group
is relatively small.14
5.1.2 Post-Apprenticeship Observations
The data is organised as an event history, and since changes of employer and spells of
unemployment are notiﬁable events, we can record them accurately. However, there is
a problem with these data in that some events are non-notiﬁable, in particular, changes
of wages and apprenticeship completion. The fact that wage changes are not notiﬁed
means that wages in a spell actually refer to mean daily wages. For apprentices com-
pleting training and then moving to another ﬁrm or into non-employment, the change
of ﬁrm is notiﬁed, and so we can pin down the end of apprenticeship precisely. How-
ever, for apprentices staying with the training ﬁrm after apprenticeship however, no
notiﬁcation is made. To understand the problem that this creates, and our solution to
it, consider the following fragment of the event history of ﬁctional person number 500,
which is typical of these data:
￿ Spell x - person number 500; ﬁrm number 1000; spell start Jan 1 1983; spell end
14This group makes up about 10-15% of all apprentices (author’s calculations with the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP)). See also Euwals and Winkelmann (2001).
33Jan 1 1984; employment status: trainee
￿ Spell x+1 - person number 500; ﬁrm number 1000; spell start Jan 1 1984; spell
end Jan 1 1985; employment status: skilled worker
￿ Spell x+2 - person number: 500; ﬁrm number: 1000; spell start Jan 1 1985; spell
end Jan 1 1986; employment status: skilled worker
This tells us that on January 1 1984, this person was still working as an apprentice.
Since we know that by 1 January 1985 this person was no longer an apprentice, we can
infer that apprenticeship ﬁnished some time between 1 January 1984 and 1 January
1985, although we do not know exactly when. The problem is that the wage recorded
for this spell will be an average of the apprenticeship wage and the post-apprenticeship
wage and will therefore be of little use to us. Our solution is to deﬁne the ﬁrst post-
apprenticeship observation as that in progress on the 1 July in the calendar year after
the last notiﬁcation of apprenticeship was given. Hence the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship
spell for this worker would be spell number x+2. To take another example, someone
who was notiﬁed as an apprentice on 1 January 1984 but then moved ﬁrms and became
a skilled worker on 15 May 1984 would have as their ﬁrst apprenticeship observation
the spell in progress on 1 July 1985.
This implies that the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship observation could in principle have
startedanywherebetween1day(lastapprenticeshipnotiﬁcationrecorded31December
1985, ﬁrst post-apprenticeship observation spell started 1 January 1986) and 18 months
(last apprenticeship notiﬁcation 1 January 1985, ﬁrst post-apprenticeship observation
spell started 31 June 1986) after the end of apprenticeship. Notice also that this is
34not necessarily the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship spell, since the apprentices could have any
number of spells of work, unemployment or time out of the labour force in between
ﬁnishing apprenticeship and the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship observation.
In order to obtain a more detailed picture of post-apprenticeship wage patterns, we
concentrate on a ﬁve-observation post-apprenticeship window. To do this, we clas-
sify spells in progress on 1 July in each year as either the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship
observation (deﬁned as above), or the second, third, fourth or ﬁfth post-apprenticeship
observation.15 Second (third, fourth, ﬁfth) post-apprenticeship observations are de-
ﬁned as those in progress in the second (third, fourth, ﬁfth) calendar year after the last
apprenticeship notiﬁcation.
5.1.3 Descriptive Statistics
The key information for our purposes is ﬁrst, whether the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship ob-
servation involves full-time work, and secondly, whether the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship
observation is a spell with the training ﬁrm. On the ﬁrst question, we only analyse
those apprentices in full-time work at the post-apprenticeship observations of interest.
Although this may be a selective group, we obviously have no wage information on
the non-employed. Regarding the second issue, if the apprentice is still with the ap-
prenticeship ﬁrm, we deﬁne this person a ‘STAYER’. Otherwise, we deﬁne her as a
‘MOVER’.16
The top panel of Table 1 uses this information to calculate the propotion of appren-
15We discard spells corresponding to spells of employment more than ﬁve calendar years after the end of
apprenticeship.
16In fact, ﬁrm numbers can change due to ﬁrm reorganisations and mergers, so there may be a few mis-
classiﬁcations. These will however be a tiny fraction of the total sum of ﬁrm changes.
35tices still with the training ﬁrm at each of the ﬁve post-apprenticeship spells. From
the Table, we see that for the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship observation, approximately 56%
of all apprentices in full-time employment are still working in the apprenticeship ﬁrm.
The typical ﬁgure for the proportion remaining with the apprenticeship ﬁrm upon com-
pleting apprenticeship is 70%, but since we are looking at apprentices in the calendar
year after the end of apprenticeship we would expect to ﬁnd a lower ﬁgure. Our es-
timates of the proportion of movers between one and ﬁve observations after appren-
ticeship (roughly, between one and ﬁve years after apprenticeship) are similar to other
estimates. For example, Euwals and Winkelmann (2001) ﬁnd that the proportion of
workers staying for at least 5 years is 26%.
Suppose next that we look at the whole sample of apprentices observed in full-time
employment at all ﬁve post-apprenticeship observations. This sample will be smaller
than the sum of the sample sizes for each post-apprenticeship observation since some
of those observed in full-time employment at the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship spell may
not be employed at the second post-apprenticeship spell (and vice-versa). We can then
classify this sample into six mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups (the sample size
and fraction of the total sample of workers observed in full-time employment across all
ﬁve post-apprenticeship observations are given in parentheses).
1. STAYER (2725, 35.03%): those observed working for the training ﬁrm across
all ﬁve post-apprenticeship observations
2. MOVE01 (3564, 45.81%): those who left the training ﬁrm some time between
ﬁnishing the apprenticeship and the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship observation
363. MOVE12 (566, 7.28%): those who left the training ﬁrm some time between the
ﬁrst and second post-apprenticeship observations
4. MOVE23 (377, 4.85%): those who left the training ﬁrm some time between the
second and third post-apprenticeship observations
5. MOVE34 (313, 4.02%): those who left the training ﬁrm some time between the
third and fourth post-apprenticeship observations
6. MOVE45 (235, 3.02%): those who left the training ﬁrm some time between the
fourth and ﬁfth post-apprenticeship observations
In order to assess how these groups differ, Table 2a presents some descriptive statis-
ticsforfourofthesixsubsamples:STAYER,MOVE01, MOVE12andMOVE45. From
the ﬁrst rows, we see dramatic differences in training ﬁrm size between the different
samples. Whilst a signiﬁcant proportion (27.21%) of the STAYER group were appren-
ticed in the largest ﬁrms, the ﬁgure for those moving between the end of apprenticeship
and the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship spell (MOVE01) is only 9.35%. On the other hand,
these apprentices are far more likely to have trained in ﬁrms with less than ten em-
ployees. In this respect, those moving between the ﬁrst and second post-apprenticeship
spell (MOVE12) look more similar to the MOVE01 group, whilst those leaving much
later (MOVE45) lie somewhere in between this group and the STAYER group.
In the next rows, we describe some facts regarding the period between the ﬁnal ap-
prenticeshipnotiﬁcationandtheﬁrstpost-apprenticeshipobservation(recallthatforthe
groupthat staywith the training ﬁrm, thelast apprenticeship notiﬁcationmay not corre-
spond exactly to the end of apprenticeship). First, we see that those workers that move
37between the end of appprenticeship and the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship spell (MOVE01)
are slightly older than those other three groups of workers still with the training ﬁrm
at this point. This conﬁrms the ﬁndings in Euwals and Winkelmann (2001). Next,
we look at the time gap between the ﬁnal apprenticeship notiﬁcation and the start of
the spell classiﬁed as the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship observation. For the three groups of
workers still with the training ﬁrm at this point (STAYER, MOVE12 and MOVE45),
the mean lag is close to 365 days. This simply says that in the vast majoity of cases,
the data look like the example presented above. The exceptions are those with spells of
unemployment or time out of the labour market between ﬁnishing apprenticeship and
starting work.17 For those that have moved, the average gap is smaller, since for many
of these, the reported end of apprenticeship may be in the middle of the calender year
prior to the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship observation.
In the next rows, we present the cumulative number of days of unemployment or
non-employment experienced byapprentices. As wewould expect, for thethreegroups
still with the training ﬁrm (STAYER, MOVE12 and MOVE45), the average number is
less than one week of unemployment and one month out of the labour force in all
cases. For the group of movers however, the average time spent unemployed is more
than two weeks, with an average of one month out of the labour force. Also of interest
is the fact that almost 40% of the movers have already moved again by the ﬁrst post-
apprenticeship observation. By the ﬁfth post-apprenticeship observation, the group
MOVE01 have an average of roughly ﬁve weeks of unemployment, ﬁve weeks out of
17Note that our classiﬁcation into ﬁve post-apprenticeship observations and the sample restriction that we
have all ﬁve obseravations for every person eliminates those with long breaks from the labour force, such as
those completing military service after apprenticeship (which typically lasts for 15 months).
38the labour force and have worked for an average of 2 new employers.
Turning to wages, we present mean daily wages at each of the ﬁve spells for each
of the four groups studied. At the ﬁrst observation, it is interesting to note that the
STAYER group have higher mean wages than the group that have already moved
(MOVE01). However, the MOVE01 group have higher mean wages than the other
groups of workers who are still with the training ﬁrm at this point but will leave the
training ﬁrm within the observation window. Although these are only raw wage levels,
these differences suggest that a preoccupation with the mover-stayer differential at the
ﬁrst post-apprenticeship observation (i.e. aggregating these different groups of stayers
into one group and comparing their wages with the group of workers that have already
moved (MOVE01)) may mask interesting and important features of the data.
One such feature can be seen by comparing the wages of the MOVER12 group
before and after they leave the training ﬁrm (the ﬁrst and second post-apprenticeship
observation respectively). Whilst this group have the lowest average wages at the ﬁrst
post-apprenticeship observation, by the second post-apprenticeship observtaion, their
average wages are similar to the MOVE01 group. Again, these are only raw wage dif-
ferentials. However, this pattern is line with the empirical implications of our model
as they relate to wage changes (MS-C1) and goes against the predictions of the asym-
metric information and ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital models ((AP-C1) and (FS-C1)).
Moreover, this phenomenon is repeated for those moving between the second and third,
third and fourth, and fourth and the ﬁfth post-apprenticeship observation. The next sec-
tion investigates whether the same pattern holds for regression-adjusted wages. First
though, we present some descriptive statistics based on the GSOEP data.
395.2 GSOEP Data
5.2.1 Basic Sample and Post-Apprenticeship Observations
The GSOEP data set is much smaller than the IAB data, and is based on an annual
survey, rather than being organised along ‘event history’ lines. We therefore proceed
by generating a sample of apprentices observed in apprenticeship at one interview and
reporting having ﬁnished apprenticeship training at the next interview. We then de-
ﬁne this interview as the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship observation. We construct similar
samples for each pair of years from 1984-1985 to 1995-1996 (inclusive). In order for
sample sizes not to become too small, our samples include all apprentices (men and
women, German and non-German) without an Abitur certiﬁcate. Pooling our eleven
pairs of years together, this create an overall sample of about 1000 individuals. By
tracking these apprentices for another year (the second post-apprenticeship interview),
we create another, albeit smaller sample of around 800 individuals.
The major advantage of the GSOEP lies in the fact that we can classify the group
of workers that have left the training ﬁrm according to the reasons why they left. This
will help us to test some of the predictions of the asymmetric information model, in
particular (AP-L3) and (AP-C3). We classify movers into two groups - those that
quit the training ﬁrm and those that left for other reasons. Since we would expect an
over-reporting of quits and an under-reporting of moves for other reasons, we include
as quits only those workers who gave ‘quit’ as their only response to the question of
why they changed ﬁrms. Any other responses - or a combination of ‘quit’ and other
responses - we classify as ‘moves for other reasons’. These other reasons change across
40the survey waves and are listed in Table A1.
5.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
In the ﬁrst row of Panel B of Table 1, we present mobility statistics based on the
GSOEP data. We see that of the 922 interviewees in full-time employment at the ﬁrst
post-apprenticeship interview, approximately one-third have already left the training
ﬁrm. Since our sample are observed a maximum of twelve months after apprenticeship
(since GSOEP interviews are typically twelve months apart), it is unsurprising that the
proportion of stayers is slightly higher than that found using the IAB.
The Table also shows that of the 341 movers, 63 could be classiﬁed as have ‘quit’
whilst 278 moved ﬁrms for other reasons. The relatively small fraction of ‘quitters’ is
certainly due in part to our classiﬁcation of ‘quit’ and ‘other’. However, it may also
be due to propensity of trainees to work for the training ﬁrm for a short time after the
end of apprenticeship, in order to signal their ability (see our discussion of section 3.2).
This is consistent with the fact that by the second post-apprenticeship observation, the
proportion still with the training ﬁrm has fallen to 49%, and, splitting into those that
quit and those that left for other reasons, the fraction of quitters has now increased to
more than one-third.
Table 2b investigates further the differences between quitters and other types of
mover further. Looking ﬁrst at training ﬁrm size, it seems that as found using the IAB
data, stayers are far more likely to have trained in larger ﬁrms, although as with all
of these results, there is a caveat regarding the small sample sizes. It is also inter-
esting to note that a smaller proportion of those quitting between the end of appren-
41ticeship and the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship observation were trained in large ﬁrms than
those moving for other reasons. Among those moving between the ﬁrst and second
post-apprenticeship interview, differences are not so apparent.
Turning to the age at the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship observation, we ﬁnd that those
workers staying across both post-apprenticeship observations are on average the oldest
at the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship observation. The differences between these results and
those found for the IAB data will in part be accounted for by the fact that we now
inlcude women and non-Germans in our sample. It should also be remembered that
whilst these samples refer to those in full-time employment at both post-apprenticeship
observations, the results reported in Table 2a based on the IAB data refer to those in
full-time employment at ﬁve post-apprenticeship observations.
Looking next at the daily wages of apprentices at the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship ob-
seravation, we see that wage levels for all groups of workers are lower than those
reported in Table 2a using the IAB data. This will in part be due to the fact that the
apprentices in the GSOEP are typically observed at an earlier stage in their career than
those in the IAB data. Again, the fact that the IAB sample is selected on the basis of a
ﬁve- rather than a two-observation atachment to the labour force will also account for
some of the difference.
The relative wages of movers and stayers look similar to those found using the
IAB data in that at the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship observation, the STAYER group en-
joys the highest average wages, followed by the group MOVE01 and then MOVE12.
Disaggregating according to whether the movers quit or left the training ﬁrm for other
reasons, we see that the average wages of quitters moving between the end of training
42and the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship interview are lower than those of apprentices moving
for other reasons, and similarly for those moving between the ﬁrst and second post-
apprenticeship interviews. As was the case with the IAB data, the group leaving the
training ﬁrm between the ﬁrst and second post-apprenticeship observations enjoy the
largest increase in mean wages. Again, this is consistent with (MS-C1) and inconsis-
tent with (AP-C1) and (FS-C1). However, these refer only to raw wage differentials,
and since we have shown that these different groups have different characteristics, we
need to ask whether these differences persist after controlling for these characteristics.
We address this question in the next section of the paper.
6 Empirical Results
This section describes our empirical results. The key test of our model involves a
comparison of the wage changes of movers and stayers. Recall that our model predicts
that the wage changes of movers should exceed those of stayers (MS-C1), whilst the
asymmetric information and ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital models predict precisely the
opposite ((AP-C1) and (FS-C1))
Before we turn to our comparisons of the wage changes of movers and stayers,
we brieﬂy review the existing literature that compares the wage levels of movers and
stayers. We argued in section 3 that whilst this comparison has been used to test the
asymmetric information and ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital theories, the comparison may
be biased towards accepting implications (AP-L1), (AP-L2) and (FS-L1) if workers
with low levels of unobserved ability are more likely to leave the training ﬁrm.
436.1 Movers versus Stayers: Wage Levels
Of the few papers that compare the wages of movers and stayers, all compare the wage
levels of stayers with those of movers. We describe the results of these papers before
presenting our own results based on the two datasets.
Previous Evidence
This setof paperscanbeclassiﬁedintothosethatattempttocontrolfor theselective
nature of moves out of the training ﬁrm, and those that do not. Table 3a summarises
the results of those studies that do not attempt to correct for selection when compar-
ing wages. In column (1), we reproduce the results of Acemoglu and Pischke (1998).
Their estimates are designed to test both (AP-L1) and (AP-L2), using those leaving the
training ﬁrm to join the military as a proxy for an ‘exogenous’ move out of the training
ﬁrm. As can be seen from the Table, they ﬁnd that both stayers and military quitters
earn slightly more than movers. Although they interpret these results as supportive of
(AP-L1) and (AP-L2), the associated standard errors are large. Morever, there is a ma-
jor problem with the data used. Whilst the survey questions relating to apprenticeship
are retrospective, the wage measure used is the current wage. Hence there are in the
sample some 55 year olds for whom earnings aged 55 are being used in conjunction
with events that occurred when the respondents were 20.
Looking across the other columns of this Table, it is clear that the results are mixed.
For example, as seem in column 2, Harhoff and Kane (1997) use the same data and ﬁnd
that the wages of movers exceed those of stayers. Of course, since the data is the same
as that used by Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), it is subject to the same difﬁculties.
44Also, only one wave of this data is used, rather than the three waves used by Acemoglu
and Pischke (1998) and no training ﬁrm controls are included.18
In the third column, we present the results of Euwals and Winkelmann (2001).
Reversing those of Harhoff and Kane (1997) these would appear to support the ﬁndings
of Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), in that the stayers now earn more than the movers,
particularly amongst those workers trained in large ﬁrms. Of course these estimates
m a ys u f f e rf r o ms e l e c t i o nb i a s e s ,a n ds ow et u r nb r i e ﬂy to two studies that address the
selection issue.
Euwals (1998) addresses the problem by estimating a switching regression model.
However, the variable used in his switching regression model (marriage) does not seem
able to adequately capture the driving force behind mobility from the ﬁrm and his
results are mixed. In the regression controlling for training ﬁrm size, he ﬁnds that
movers earn more than stayers (theestimated coefﬁcient (standard error) on the ‘stayer’
variable (movers are the base group) is -0.029 (0.012) for those trained in ﬁrms with
over 50 employees and 0.006 (0.009) for those trained in all ﬁrms).
Werwatz (1996) also estimates a switching regression model, this time using age at
the end of apprenticeship and a dummy variable for school type as variables intended
to capture mobility. Werwatz (1996) ﬁnds that male movers earn around 9% more than
male stayers, whilst female movers earn 11% less than female stayers. Again however,
the selection equation is not well determined and results are mixed. For these reasons,
18Harhoff and Kane (1997) interpret their results as evidence in favour of a mobility cost explanation of
ﬁrm investment. We have ignored this possibility, since we see no reason why mobility costs should be
increasing in the level of training offered. That is, whilst mobility costs would enable ﬁrms to earn rents on
all workers (since mobility costs would enable ﬁrms to pay workers less than their marginal product), there
seems no reason to suppose that these costs - and therefore ﬁrm rents - are increasing in the level of training
offered.
45we prefer to control for selection out of the training ﬁrm using longtitudinal data. We
present the results of this analysis in the next subsection. First though, we present our
own estimates of the wage differences in levels.
Evidence based on IAB data
Table4apresentstheresultsofourwagecomparisonsattheﬁrstpost-apprenticeship
observation using the IAB data. In column (1), we present a speciﬁcation including
only training ﬁrm size dummies, age and age squared as expanatory variables, in addi-
tion to a dummy variable indicating whether or not the worker is still with the training
ﬁrm. Notice that we follow the previous literature in not distinguishing stayers accord-
ing to when they eventually left the training ﬁrm. For example, we aggregate together
those with the training ﬁrm that stay across all ﬁve post-apprenticeship observations
(STAYER) and those that leave between the ﬁrst and second post-apprenticeship ob-
servation (MOVE12).
Focusing ﬁrst on the other variables included in the equation, we see that age has
a small but positive impact on earnings, although the age squared term is never sig-
niﬁcant. More dramatic are the training ﬁrm size coefﬁcients. Although these are
not included in the Table, the estimated coefﬁcients increase sharply (single employer
ﬁrms are the excluded category) between ﬁrms with between two and nine employ-
ees (coefﬁcient 0.24; standard error 0.015) and those with more than 1000 employees
(coefﬁcient 0.479, standard error 0.015). This pattern is to be expected, since it has
been shown elsewhere that the most able school-leavers typically train in the largest
ﬁrms (see especially Harhoff and Kane (1993) who present self-reported test scores by
apprenticeship ﬁrm size). We also include year dummies in the speciﬁcation. As we
46would expect, coefﬁcients are large for later years, picking up the general increase in
real wages over the period.
Turning now to themover-stayer differential, we ﬁnd that stayers earn slightly more
than movers. Our ﬁnding is similar to that of ? who use the same dataset and a slightly
different sample. In Table 2a, we showed that the MOVE01 group typically expe-
rienced more time in unemployment and more time out of the labour force between
apprenticeship completion and the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship observation, hence we in-
clude these variables in speciﬁcation (2). As we would expect, they are negatively
correlated with earnings, with one month in unemployment associated with roughly a
0.3% drop in earnings and one month out of the labour force associated with roughly
a 0.5% drop in earnings. Including these terms results in a slight fall in the stayer
earnings advantage.
We do not wish to include any current employer characteristics such as ﬁrm size
in our speciﬁcation, since we want to compare wage levels without conditioning on
these variables. For example, if large ﬁrms pay higher wages (for whatever reason)
and workers can earn higher wages by leaving small training ﬁrms to work for larger
ﬁrms, we want to allow our estimates to capture this. The suspicion that controlling for
employing ﬁrm characteristics would over-estimate the earnings advanatage of stay-
ers is conﬁrmed in speciﬁcation (3), where we include employing ﬁrm size dummies.
Speciﬁcation (4) restricts the sample to the period after 1983, since it can be argued
that the wage data are more reliable over this period19. In fact, it does not have a great
impact on our results. Finally, in speciﬁcation (5), we restrict the sample to those work-
19Prior to 1984, ﬁrms were not obliged to report extra payments such as Christmas and holiday bonuses,
which are an important part of compensation in Germany.
47ers trained in ﬁrms of over 100 workers. Consistent with some of the other literature
(especially ?) we now ﬁnd a substantial wage advantage for stayers over movers, of the
order of 8%.
To summarise, when comparing wages at the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship observation,
we ﬁnd results similar to some of those estimated elsewhere. In particular, we ﬁnd
that stayers earn slightly more than movers across most of the speciﬁcations, and sub-
stantially more when concentrating only on large training ﬁrms. Whilst these results
support (AP-L1), it should be remembered that some other papers ﬁnd that movers earn
more than stayers. More importantly, since these estimates do not adequately control
for selection out of the training ﬁrm, the next subsection analyses the wage dynamics
of movers and stayers over a longer period. First though, we perform a similar analysis
using the GSOEP data.
Evidence based on GSOEP data
Table 4b presents the results of comparing the wages of movers and stayers at the
ﬁrst post-apprenticeship interview using the GSOEP data. In column (1), we estimate a
speciﬁcation similar to that estimated in Table 4a, except that we now include dummy
variables for being ‘male’ and ‘German’. Estimates for age and the training ﬁrm size
dummies are similar in sign and magnitude to those estimated using the IAB data, and
whilstthe‘male’ estimate is largeandpositive, the‘German’estimate is notsigiﬁcantly
different from zero. In contrast to our estimates, we now ﬁnd that movers earn slightly
more than stayers. That this result is different to that estimated using the IAB data is
in line with the mixed evidence presented in Table 3. Once again however, we ﬁnd that
stayers earn more than movers when we focus on large ﬁrms only (speciﬁcations (5)).
48Including employing ﬁrm size dummies (speciﬁcations (3)) does not affect our results
substantially.
The main motive for using the GSOEP data is to break down the group of movers
into those that quit and those that moved for other reasons. This will allow us to test
(AP-L3). In the basic speciﬁcation (2) and the extended speciﬁcation (4), we see that
the differences between the two groups of movers are not large. However, focussing
only on those apprentices trained in large ﬁrms (speciﬁcation (6)), we see that ap-
prentices quitting large ﬁrms enjoy positive wage differentials, whilst those leaving for
other reasons have negative wage differentials. This is evidence against the presence of
asymmetric information in the market for new apprentices (AP-L3), since this theory
predicts that the oustide labour market should not be able to tell these two groups apart.
6.2 Movers versus Stayers: Wage Changes
We now turn to a comparison of the wages of those that stayed with the training ﬁrm
and those that left some time after the apprenticeship was completed. We begin with
the results based on our IAB sample, before turning to the GSOEP data.
IAB Data
Recall that we can use the IAB data to generate a sample of workers each with ﬁve
post-apprenticeship observations. In section 5, we described how we split these into six
mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups: STAYER, MOVE01, MOVE12, MOVE23,
MOVE34 and MOVE45. In the previous section, we pooled the ﬁve groups of work-
ers still with the training ﬁrm at the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship observation (STAYER,
49MOVE12, MOVE23, MOVE34 and MOVE45). Now however, we split these groups
up and compare wages at all ﬁve post-apprenticeship observations.
The results are presented in Panel A of Table 5a. Focus ﬁrst on the ﬁrst column
of the Table, which refers to the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship observation. Looking down
the rows of the Table we see the earnings differentials of all ﬁve groups of mover,
relative to the stayers (the base category). The speciﬁcation is identical to column (2)
of Table 4, and the estimated age effects are similar. Notice however that the sample
size is much smaller, since we are now focussing only on those workers in full-time
employment at all ﬁve post-apprenticeship observations.
The interesting feature of column (1) is that whilst those workers that have already
left the ﬁrm earn slightly less than those workers that eventually stay with the ﬁrm
across all ﬁve post-apprenticeship observations, they earn signiﬁcantly more than the
other group of stayers that will eventually leave the training ﬁrm. Turning then to
column (2) of the Table, we see the results of the same equation estimated at the second
post-apprenticeship observation, after the group MOVE12 have left the training ﬁrm.
Now, we see that whilst the MOVE23, MOVE34 and MOVE45 groups still earn less
than the STAYER and MOVE01 group, the wages of this MOVE12 group are no longer
signiﬁcantly different to the STAYER group. This suggests that these workers can
increase their (relative) wages by leaving the training ﬁrm. This is strong evidence in
favour of (MS-C1) and against (AP-C1) and (FS-C1).
Looking across the remaining three columns of the Table, we see this pattern re-
peated for the other groups of movers (MOVE23, MOVE34 and MOVE45). This can
be seen even more clearly in Figure 1, which plots the wage differentials of all movers
50relative to the base group of stayers (whose wages are normalised to zero). In Panel B
of the Table, we estimate the same equations for only those workers trained in ﬁrms of
more than 100 employees (the wage differentials are plotted in Figure 2). Whilst the
pattern is now less clear, increases in relative wages are still experienced by each group
upon moving.
We interpret these patterns as further evidence in favour our claim that comparing
the wages of movers and stayers in levels at the ﬁrst-post-apprenticeship observation
masks interesting patterns in the wage dynamics of movers and stayers. Moreover,
the increase in wages experienced by all types of mover is strongly suggestive of
a matching-screening explanation for human capital investment and strongly against
asymmetric information or speciﬁc human capital explanations for ﬁrm investment.
In order to examine the asymmetric information argument further, we now present a
similar analysis based on the GSOEP.
GSOEP Data
We use the GSOEP to compare the wage dynamics of movers and stayers over
a short time period (two post-apprenticeship observations) and the results are plotted
in Table 5b. We ﬁnd that at the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship observation, the earnings of
the group moving between the end of apprenticeship and the ﬁrst post-apprenticeship
observation are not signiﬁcantly different to those of the stayers, whilst the earnings
of the group moving between the ﬁrst and second post-apprenticeship observations are
much lower. At the second post-apprenticeship observation however, after this group
has left the training ﬁrm, this conclusion no longer holds, and the earnings of this group
are now insigniﬁcantly different to those of the stayers.
51Looking at the movers according to whether they quit the training ﬁrm or left for
other reasons, we see that this pattern holds for both groups, although the effect is more
dramatic for those quitting between the ﬁrst and second post-apprenticeship observa-
tions. This is evidence against asymmetric information implication (AP-C3), since
the theory again predicts that the wage changes of these two groups should (ceteris
parabus) be identical. Finally, in the bottom panel of the Table, we restrict attention to
only the largest training ﬁrms. We see familiar patterns of wage dynamics for movers
and stayers when the different types of movers are aggregated together, but diaggre-
gating the movers, we ﬁnd that the increase in relative wages between the two post-
apprenticeship observations is accounted for entirely by the group of movers quitting
the training ﬁrm. Again, this is strong evidence against the asymmetric information
hypothesis.
7 Conclusions
The paper presented a model of the labour market in which a combination of match
heterogeneity and screening costs gave incumbent ﬁrms some monopsony power and
enabled them to earn rents on retained workers. Without matching, the screening prob-
lem would be trivial, since workers would essentially be the same. Without screening
costs, the labour market would be competitive, in the sense that an inﬁnite number
of ﬁrms would bid for workers, with workers leaving to work at the ﬁrm where they
were most productive. The crucial ingredient in our model is the assumption that train-
ing increases the costs of screening, and therefore increases the monopsony power of
52workers. Although it is a well known fact that screening costs are a sharply increasing
function of a worker’s skill level, we believe that this is the ﬁrst model to account for
and exploit this fact.
We also showed that wage patterns of trained workers are consistent with our
model, at least for the case of German apprentices. Although we also interpreted our
results as evidence against the asymmetric information model of Acemoglu and Pis-
chke (1998) and the generic ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital model, we would not claim
that asymmetric information arguments are never relevant to the decision of ﬁrms to
invest in general training. Instead, it would appear to us that different motives may
drive the training decisions for different types of workers. Hence for the case of low-
skilled workers with tenuous attachments to the labour force, asymmetric information
may well be the driving force behind training decisions, and Autor (2001) presents
convincing evidence to this effect. For more educated workers however, where ability
is likely to be known, or easily signalled, we believe that a combination of matching
and screening costs may drive training decisions. Empirical analyses of other training
institutions would help to conﬁrm whether or not this was in fact the case.
53A Proofs of Propositions
In this Appendix, we derive the results ommitted from section 2. We begin by deriving
the optimal bidding strategy of bidder i after he has paid the cost k of inspecting the
match and has a valuation for worker j of vij.
A.1 Optimal Bidding
We proceed by guessing that the optimal bid satisﬁes certain properties, deriving the
optimal bid under these assumptions, and then showing that that this is in fact an equi-
librium bid20. In particular, we guess that the optimal bidding strategy is to bid:
B(vij)=αj + b(ξij)
if vij is greater than some marginal type v0 and to not bid if vij <v 0,w h e r eb(.) is a
strictly increasing function.
To derive the optimal bid under these guesses, we use the fact that the expected
proﬁt of a bidder after he has drawn his valuation vij can be written as:
Π(vij)=Q(vij)vij − P(vij) (A1)
where Q(.) is the equilibrium probability of winning function, and P is the expected
payment function. From a standard version of the revenue equivalence theorem, we
20This subsection closely follows the discussion in Matthews (1995).





where Πi(v0) is the proﬁt of the marginal type v0 (see for example {matthews:1995}).
Provided that the auction awards the object to the highest bidder (as most standard
auction types do), then given our guess that b(.) is strictly increasing, the equilibrium
probability of winning is:
Q(vij)=G(vij)=G(ξij)
if ξij >v 0−αj = e v0, and zero otherwise. In other words, the equilibrium probability-
of-winning function G(.)=F(.)n−1 is the probability that bidder i has the best match
among n potential bidders. Hence from (A2), the expected proﬁt of a bidder after he





Under the assumptions on the bid function B(.), the expected payment of a bidder
with valuation vij in a ﬁrst-price auction is:
P(vij)=[ αj + b(ξij)]G(ξij)
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Since the marginal type wins with probability G(e v0) with any bid not less than the
reservation bid price w0, this type must bid exactly w0. For type e v0 to make zero
expected proﬁt when bidding w0, it must be the case that:
w0 = αj + e v0
Hence for the marginal type, e v0 = w0 − αj = f w0. Substituting this into the optimal
b i df u n c t i o n( A 4 ) ,w eh a v et h a t :






Hence the optimal bid function B(.) that we have found satisﬁes our guesses. Prov-
56ing that it is actually an equilibrium is standard, since the presence of αj makes no
difference to the ‘pseudo-concavity’ or second-order condition (see Matthews (1995)).
A.2 1+Hf w0(w0) > 0
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We examine both sides of equation (A6) in turn.
A.2.1 Left-Hand-Side of (A6)














where all three terms are positive.
57A.2.2 Right-Hand-Side of (A6)
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59Hence we can write:
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Since
F 0(f w0)
F(f w0) > 0, dn
df w0 < 0 and lnF(f w0)<0, every term in this expression is posi-
tive,hence we have that [1+Hf w0(f w0)] > 0.
B Data Appendix
B.1 IAB Data
We use data from the German Institute for Employment Research (IAB) for the years
1975-1995. The basis of the IAB employment subsample is the integrated notifying
procedure for health insurance, statutory pension scheme and unemployment insurance
which is regulated through German legislation. The procedure requires that employers
report all information of their employees registered by the social security system to
the social security agencies. Employers have to notify the beginning and the end of an
employment spell and have to give an annual notiﬁcation for each employee. The em-
ployment statistics include all employees obliged to pay social insurance contributions.
The employment statistics do not include, among others, civil servants, family work-
ers, those in marginal employment, and students enrolled in higher education (Cramer
60(1985)). For 1995, the employment statistics cover nearly 79.4% of all employed per-
sons in Western Germany (Bender, Haas, and Klose (2000)).
The notiﬁcation provides information on individual characteristics as gender, year
of birth, number of children and qualiﬁcations. Furthermore it reports information on
the employment including information on the occupational code, the occupational sta-
tus, the establishment number of the employer with information on the size and the
industry of the employer, and ﬁnally the gross earnings of the employee over the past
employment spell which served as the basis for social security contributions. This in-
formation is passed on from the social insurance agencies to the Federal Employment
Services and collected in the so called historic ﬁle. The IAB employment subsam-
ple is an anonymised 1% sample from the historic ﬁle. Details of the anonymisation
procedure are described in Bender, Haas, and Klose (2000). Due to the fact that the
information for East Germany is only available for the time after uniﬁcation we use
only the information of notiﬁcations for people working in Western Germany. The
employment subsample contains a total of 7,847,553 notiﬁcations with 6,711,153 no-
tiﬁcations for Western Germany. On the basis of the ﬁnal notiﬁcations in each case,
the ﬁle provides information of 483,327 Western Germans (Bender, Haas, and Klose
(2000), p.2).
Apart from information in the historic ﬁle, the IAB employment subsample con-
tains information from two other data sources. The beneﬁts recipients ﬁle contains
person-related information on periods in which the Federal Employment Service paid
beneﬁts like the status of the unemployed and the type of beneﬁt payments (unemploy-
ment beneﬁt, unemployment assistance or maintenance payments for participating in
61training or re-training programs). But not all spells of registered non-employment were
covered (Bender, Haas, and Klose (2000)). The second ﬁle which adds information
to IAB employment subsample is the establishment ﬁle. The ﬁle provides additional
information on the notifying establishment as the date of birth and death of the estab-
lishment as well as generated information on the pattern of skill levels of employees
within the establishment.
B.2 GSOEP Data
The GSOEP is a panel dataset from 1984 to the present consisting of some 13,500
individuals and roughly 7000 households living in West and East Germany. The inter-
national ’public use’ version of data is used here, and this contains approximately 5%
fewer observations. See Burkhauser (1991) for more details on the public use version.
Aside form the classiﬁcation of movers discussed in section 5, the other impor-
tant issue is the measurement of earnings and the weighting procedure used. We use
reported gross monthly earnings, and where we provide a daily wage, we derive this
by dividing the monthly ﬁgure by 30, in order to make it as comparable as possible
to the measure used in the IAB data. As regards weighting, although the ﬁrst wave
of the survey (excluding immigrants) is representative of the non-immigrant German
population, since we include immigrants in many of our estimations we weight all of
our cross-sectional samples using cross-section sampling weights. Moreover, since at-
trition out of the survey is non-random, we generate longtitudinal weights based on the
cross-section sampling weights and the attrition probabilities available in the GSOEP
in all of our samples involving more than one year of data for the same individuals.
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65Figure 1: Wage Dynamics of ‘Movers’ and ‘Stayers’: All Training Firms 
 















Notes: Data drawn from results presented in Table 5a. Log earnings differentials refer to 
estimated coefficients in log earnings equations estimated at each of the five post-
apprenticeship observations. Figure 2: Wage Dynamics of ‘Movers’ and ‘Stayers’: Large Training Firms 
 















Notes: Data drawn from results presented in Table 5a. Log earnings differentials refer to 
estimated coefficients in log earnings equations estimated at each of the five post-
apprenticeship observations. See section 5 of the text for definitions of the different 
groups. 
 Table 1: Mobility from the Training Firm

































19808 6247 N/A N/A 13561 31.54








811 397 116 298 414 48.95
Notes: See section 5 for a discussion of how the data are organised into post-apprenticeship observationsTable 2a: Descriptive Statistics: IAB Data
STAYER MOVE01 MOVE12 MOVE45
Training Firm Size
1 2.05 2.57 2.10 1.31
2-9 13.05 28.90 24.67 21.40
10-19 10.11 14.52 16.63 15.28
20-49 12.00 14.79 18.55 13.10
50-99 8.92 7.71 9.56 11.35
100-499 18.68 16.14 15.30 18.34
500-999 7.99 6.01 4.40 5.68
1000+ 27.21 9.35 8.80 13.54
First Post-Apprenticeship Observation
Age 20.669 20.995 20.564 20.443
Days between Apprenticeship and Spell 356.242 287.684 362.497 349.401
Cumulative Days of Unemployment 2.480 17.530 6.034 6.432
Cumulative Days of Non-Employment 12.120 30.204 22.101 9.149
Cumulative Number of Firms 0 1.397 0 0
Daily Wage 114.932 109.294 99.765 107.485
Second Post-Apprenticeship
Observation
Cumulative Days of Unemployment 4.816 25.318 24.710 10.332
Cumulative Days of Non-Employment 13.189 34.430 30.731 10.345
Cumulative Number of Firms 0 1.631 1.189 0
Daily Wage 122.920 118.730 117.063 115.926
Third Post-Apprenticeship Observation
Cumulative Days of Unemployment 7.429 30.714 31.607 11.413
Cumulative Days of Non-Employment 13.898 37.417 33.347 10.770
Cumulative Number of Firms 0 1.812 1.375 0
Daily Wage 129.0362 125.2807 124.683 121.547
Fourth Post-Apprenticeship Observation
Cumulative Days of Unemployment 10.906 35.959 36.819 14.319
Cumulative Days of Non-Employment 14.346 39.534 34.538 12.660
Cumulative Number of Firms 0 1.959 1.522 0
Daily Wage 133.943 130.754 130.656 125.088
Fifth Post-Apprenticeship Observation
Cumulative Days of Unemployment 13.425 40.827 40.863 31.474
Cumulative Days of Non-Employment 14.980 41.699 38.225 19.171
Cumulative Number of Firms 0 2.076 1.644 1.192
Daily Wage 138.784 135.974 135.678 136.358
N 2591 3346 523 229










<20 0.238 0.365 0.330 0.412 0.433
20-200 0.351 0.382 0.355 0.401 0.373
200-2000 0.200 0.216 0.222 0.128 0.150
>2000 0.211 0.037 0.090 0.059 0.044
Sex 0.579 0.477 0.497 0.518 0.496




Age 20.705 19.979 20.102 19.104 19.728




DM 107.792 101.839 107.788 97.914 93.494
N 519 51 257 52 70
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>50 All Industry Craft >100 All
ESTIMATES ESTIMATES ESTIMATES




























Sample Size 5355 13051 2302 3711 2659 6451Table 4a: Wages at First Post-Apprenticeship Observation: IAB Data






































































YES YES YES YES YES
Employer Firm
Size Dummies
NO NO YES NO NO
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
N 17963 17963 17963 12866 6955
Notes: see text of section 6 for a discussion of the different specificationsTable 4b: Wages in First Post-Apprenticeship Observation: GSOEP Data























































































YES YES YES YES YES YES
Employer Firm
Size Dummies
NO NO YES YES YES YES
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 777 777 761 761 331 331
Notes: see section 5 of the text for a definition of the different groups, including the two types of mover
(‘quit’ and ‘other’). See text of section 6 for a discussion of the different specificationsTable 5a: Wage Dynamics of Movers and Stayers: IAB Data
Obsn 1 Obsn 2 Obsn 3 Obsn 4 Obsn 5


































































































































YES YES YES YES YES
Year YES YES YES YES YES
N 7292 7292 7296 7299 7303










































































N 2907 2909 2909 2908 2912
Notes: In all cases, the base group are the ‘STAYERS’ group. See section 5 of the text for definitions of the
different groupsTable 5b: Wage Dynamics of Movers and Stayers: GSOEP data
Observation 1 Observation 2




































































YES YES YES YES
Year YES YES YES YES
N 509 509 519 519
































N 211 211 217 217
Notes: See the text of section 5 for a discussion of the different groups and a definition of `quit’ and ‘other’.Table A1: Coding of Different Types of Firm Change in GSOEP
1985-86 1987-1990 1991-1995
‘QUIT’ Quit Quit Quit
‘OTHER’ Fired Fired Fired
Mutual Mutual Transfer
Transfer Transfer
Contract End Contract End Contract End
Training End Training End Training End
Downsize Downsize
End Self-Employment End Self-Employment End Self-Employment
Other Early Retirement Retirement
Other Early Retirement
Other
Company Bankruptcy Company Bankruptcy Company Closed